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ABSTRACT
 
The objective of this study was to determine whether it
 
is beneficial to a home health agency to pay nurses on a
 
piecework (pay-per-visit) system as opposed to an hourly
 
rate of pay. The study looked at the behavior of seventeen
 
registered tiurses employed by Ramona VNA and Hospice who
 
worked for at least nine months prior to and nine months
 
immediately following the implementation of a pay-per-visit
 
system. Variables studied included productivity, amount of
 
time spent performing patient care related functions, length
 
of home visits, and the amount of time spent in patient
 
conferences, inservices and meetings. A survey was also
 
sent to the nurses in the study to determine how they felt .
 
about the pay-per-visit system and what they perceived to be
 
its impact on patient care.
 
The findings:of the study clearly illustrated .that ;
 
nurses' behaved differently when being paid on a pay-per­
visit system. Their productivity was higher, they became
 
more efficient in the use of their time, and they spent lesS:
 
time in conferences and meetings. Most of the nurses
 
preferred the pay-per-visit system and felt that it had had
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a positive effect on their income, although they expressed
 
concern that the pay-per-visit system would have a negative
 
impact on the quality df patient care and would discourage
 
team work.
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DEFINITION OF TERMS
 
A Home Health Aaencv is an organization licensed by the
 
state Department of Health for the purpose of providing
 
skilled medical services to individuals in their homes.
 
Services typically include nursing; physical, occupational,
 
and speech therapy; social services; and home health aide
 
services. The unit of service is a home visit for which
 
there is a charge. Revenue is based on the charge per visit
 
which is billed to the patients' third party payors. Most
 
home health agencies are also certified by Medicare and
 
Medical so they can bill these publically funded programs.
 
Pay-per-visit is a method of compensation which is
 
based on piece work. Patient care staff are paid a rate for
 
each home visit made. The visit rate paid is a factor of
 
the staff member's hourly wage. The factor for each type of
 
visit is determined by the complexity of the visit and the
 
standard productivity for the type of staff making the
 
visit. In addition to the per-visit rate, employees are
 
also paid on an hourly basis for certain activities such as
 
patient care conferences, meetings and inservices,,and non-

patient care related activities. Staff members are required
 
i., 'Hx;; ,
 
to account for all of their work time, whether paid at the
 
hourly or per-visit rate for purposes of figuring overtime,
 
benefits, and other accounting functions.
 
Nursing productivity is typically measured in home
 
health care settings by the number of visits a nurse makes
 
in an eight hour day. For the purposes of this study,
 
productivity was defined as the number of "billable visits"
 
made per eight hours worked. Home Health Aide Supervision
 
visits were counted as billable visits even though they are
 
not technically a billable visit because they are mandated
 
by licensure and certification regulations. Non billable
 
admission visits were also counted in determining
 
productivity. Other types of npn-billable visits and not
 
home visits were not counted as billable visits made.
 
Typically the purpose of not counting non revenue producing
 
visits toward a nurse's productivity is to encourage them to
 
make as few as possible and to make sure that the nurse has
 
confirmed with the patient that they are home, expecting a
 
visit, before driving to the patient's home.
 
A Nursing visit is a visit to an individual patient by
 
a registered nurse for the purpose of providing skilled
 
nursing service(s) as ordered by the patient's physician.
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Services include, but are not limited to, physical
 
assessment, patient education, and treatments such as wound
 
care, intravenous,infusions, etc. The nurse contacts the
 
patient before the visit to confirm it with the patient or
 
the patient's caregiver. Appropriate documentation is
 
completed both during and after the visit. It may be
 
necessary to follow up with phone calls and other
 
coordination activities to ensure that the patient's needs
 
are being met appropriately.
 
A billable visit is a revenue producing visit; one that
 
the home health agency will bill a third party payor for.
 
For the purposes of this study, even though home health aide
 
supervision visits are not technically billable, they were
 
included as billable. visits, because they are mandated by
 
licensure and certification requirements. Non billable
 
admission visits were also included because these are
 
nursing visits made to open a patient to rehab services
 
which will be revenue producing. Other types of nonbillable
 
visits and not home visits were not included as billable
 
visits.
 
Patient care conferences are formally organized
 
multidisciplinary team conferences. They are prescheduled
 
xi
 
and mandatorY. They do not include the bccasionar informal
 
discussions that occur betweeh team rnembers relative to
 
current patient care issues.
 
Inservices are educational sessions oraanized by the
 
management staff M a:re either mandatory or:attendance
 
is encouraged V The nurses' are paid an hourly rate for the
 
time spent in attendance whether they are on an hourly or
 
pay-per-visit compensation system.
 
Staff meetings are formally organized meetings which
 
are called by management staff. Attendance is usually
 
mandatory or encouraged. The nurses' are paid an hourly
 
rate for the time spent in attendance whether they are on an
 
hourly or pay-per-visit compensation system.
 
Service Personnel Route and Time Sheet "Route Sheet" is
 
a document used to track patient visit activity as well as
 
time worked by patient care staff. Each visit made is
 
documented and coded for appropriate billing status. The
 
nurse documents all time worked according to the type of
 
activity being performed. Both billing and payroll
 
information is obtained from this form.
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CHAPTER 1 - STATEMENT OF THE PROBLEM
 
Introduction
 
The home care industry, like most industries today is
 
looking for ways to decrease the cost of production and
 
improve the efficiency of its labor force. For home care
 
providers, the key is to reduce the cost of providing
 
service, or more commonly referred to as reducing the cost
 
per visit which is the unit of service in home health.
 
Although reimbursement for home care services was once
 
heavily dominated by Medicare which pays on a cost-based
 
reimbursement system, an increasing share of revenue is now
 
coming from managed care. The revenue per unit of service
 
from managed care third party payors is much less than the
 
reimbursement allowed in the Medicare program and even
 
continues to decrease. In addition, it is expected that
 
within the next year the federal government will make
 
changes in its reimbursement system for home health
 
agencies. No longer will the industry enjoy cost based
 
reimbursement, but will be reimbursed on a per episode or
 
prospective pay type methodology. In light of these
 
reimbursement issues, it is imperative that costs of
 
providing home health services be reduced.
 
One way that home health agencies have chosen to deal
 
with this problem is to convert clinical staff from hourly
 
to pay-per-visit mechanisms of pay. Rehabilitation staff
 
i.e. physical therapists have been traditionally reimbursed
 
on a pay-per-visit method both as independent contractors
 
and agency staff. However, pay-per-visit is a relatively
 
recent phenomenon for nursing staff in home health settings.
 
Some home health agencies have tnany years of history paying
 
nurses pay-per-visit. Some agencies have recently
 
implemented it, and others are grappling with whether or not
 
pay-per-visit is the answer for them.
 
Ramona VNA and Hospice in Hemet, California, is one
 
home health agency that decided to change its compensation
 
method for nurses from hourly to pay-per-visit. This
 
provided an opportunity to conduct a study to compare the
 
nurses' behavior before and after implementation of the pay-

per-visit system.
 
Statement of the Problem
 
Does a pay-per-visit system incentivize home health
 
nurses to be more productive, thus reducing direct costs and
 
yet 	maintain quality patient care and employee satisfaction?
 
Research Questions
 
1. 	 Is there a difference in nursing productivity as a
 
result of implementing pay-per-visit?
 
2. 	 Is there a difference in the direct cost of a nursing
 
visit between hourly and pay-per-visit systems?
 
3. 	 Is there a difference in the length of time nurses
 
spend in patients' homes when nurses are paid per visit
 
as opposed to hourly?
 
4. 	 Is there a difference in the amount of time spent by
 
nurses in patient care conferences when they are paid
 
per visit?
 
5. 	 is there a difference in the amount of time spent in
 
inservices and staff meetings when nurses are paid per
 
visit?'■ ' 
6. 	 Are nurses satisfied with pay-per-visit? Do they want
 
to continue or would they prefer to return to hourly
 
pay?
 
7. 	 Do nurses feel that they are receiving fair and
 
equitable compensation with pay-per-visit?
 
8. Do nurses feel that quality of care is jeopardized by a
 
pay-per-visit system?
 
CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW
 
Introduction
 
In this era of managed care, cost containment, and
 
health care organization downsizing the forces that shape
 
wage and benefit programs are changing rapidly. Variation
 
in pay levels from one healthcare organization to another in
 
a given market will narrow as pressures mount from competing
 
in a managed care environment. The key for an organization
 
to gain a competitive edge may be in the way they pay
 
employees. Healthcare organizations that are able to
 
develop a cost advantage in their wage and benefit programs
 
gain a competitive edge as managed care continues to become
 
more pervasive.
 
In order to gain a competitive edge healthcare
 
organizations must develop pay systems that provide
 
competitive pay and incentives for increased productivity
 
and cost control. They must reward quality, productivity,
 
and cost containment. Employee benefit systems need to be
 
developed that provide cost-containment incentives while
 
meeting organizational recruitment and retention objectives.
 
As labor shortages continue to ease, pay will be based more
 
frequently on the perforraanGes of individuals and
 
organizations and less frequently on the pressures of the
 
labor market. (Miller 1995)
 
U.S. business in general can no longer be satisfied
 
with traditional pay systems that are based on entitlement,
 
internal equity, and bureaucratic and hierarchical concepts
 
of organizational design that detract from the ability to
 
compete effectively in a global economy. Pay is a key
 
communicator of goals, values, directions, and strategies.
 
Unless organizations communicate the importance of total
 
organizational success, product and service quality,
 
customer value, and teamwork and cdllaboratioh for the
 
effective deployment of all resources, important
 
opportunities will be lost. (Schuster and Zingheim 1993)
 
Many companies, including health Care organizations,
 
are dealing with the task of motivating superior performance
 
and increasing productivity while also dealing with smaller
 
salary increase budgets and pressures to "hold the line" on
 
fixed costs. The need to increase incentives for
 
productivity may result in a restructuring of compensation
 
for home health managers as well as nurses. This paper
 
addresses some of the possibilities for creating a pay
 
structure to do that. The paper will look only at salary
 
and assume that a benefit package is structured to be both
 
competitive and financially sound for the organization so as
 
not to impact recruitment and/or retention in a negative
 
way.
 
Creatively managed compensation systems can
 
dramatically enhance a company's ability to compete. They
 
can also improve employee relations. Increasingly,
 
companies are making decisions on the basis of deliberate
 
strategies which shift the focus from effectively
 
administering a plan to ensuring that the plan helps the
 
business compete. It is important to identify which
 
compensation issues are believed to be critical to the
 
success of the organization and how these can be linked with
 
performance. According to Milkovich and Milkovich (1992),
 
one particular pay structure does not necessarily fit all.
 
Differences must be the result of deliberate strategy and
 
subsequent financial performance. He concluded that
 
developing a pay strategy is more a matter of choosing how
 
to pay, not how much.
 
Performance Based Pay
 
Pegging base pay either above or below the market may
 
jeopardize competitiveness. In contrast, incentives,
 
bonuses, and other forms of variable pay provide
 
flexibility. For example, deemphasizing base pay and
 
emphasizing incentives can conserve cash for a rapidly
 
growing company. Tying pay to productivity can reduce risk
 
for firms with fluctuating product demand and high labor
 
costs. The research indicates that successful organizations
 
make deliberate choices that enable them to link their
 
compensation policies to their business strategy. (Milkovich
 
and Milkovich 1992) Business interests favor variable
 
compensation plans because they shift some business risk to
 
labor and provide incentives to the workforce. Variable pay
 
is a way to ensure that compensation costs rise, and more
 
importantly, fall at the same rate as corpprate earnings.
 
Use of a high base may attract the best talent; a high
 
bonus-to-base ratio may focus employees' attention on
 
outcomes; and long-term incentives may encourage people to
 
stay with the firm long enough to reap the payoffs of their
 
research. Research supports the notion that compensation
 
strategies can contribute to the organization's success,
 
most likely by communicating and reinforcing the performance
 
required by the business strategy. (Milkovich and Milkovich
 
1992)
 
Companies are making their nonmanagement employees
 
eligible for awards under variable pay programs more
 
frequently each year. The trend of extending eligibility in
 
variable pay programs to lower levels of the organization is
 
likely to continue. (Zitaner 1992)
 
The variety among performance-based pay plans is almost
 
as great as the number of work behaviors they seek to
 
encourage. The National Academy of Science assembled a team
 
of experts in an effort to understand the current state of
 
knowledge regarding performance-based pay. These experts
 
categorized the wide variety of available plans using two
 
dimensions. -The first level at which performance is
 
measured is whether individual or group performance
 
determines payment. The second dimension is the way that
 
performance payments are made. These performance-based pay
 
plans are loosely grouped under the heading "variable pay."
 
(LeBlanc 1994)
 
Plans that are designed in harmony with strategy and
 
culture, and that are monitored for their impact on
 
achieving desired goals, will ultimately be viewed by both
 
plan designers and plan participants as highly "successful."
 
Perhaps part of the reasbh plans are viewed as less than
 
successful is that they are being asked to address goals and
 
objectives that they were not designed to influence.
 
(Schuster and Zingheim 1993)
 
Variable Pay
 
Variable pay is defined as any kind of pay given
 
strictly on the basis of employee or corporate performance.
 
(Hayes 1993) This new tool lets a company reward good
 
employees and still keep payroll costs down. Variable pay
 
can take on many forms, covering the gamut from once-in-a­
lifetime cash awards to profit-sharing, so each firm must
 
choose just the right kind for them.
 
At the very least, variable pay programs can help
 
companies control compensation costs. When properly
 
designed and implemented, variable pay plans can hold out
 
the very real potential of shaking up any type of
 
organization. Incentive pay can pull a company out of the
 
doldrums of complacency and create a new, vibrant operating
 
environment in which all truly espouse the concept of
 
"shared destiny" and believe that every individual can make
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 a differen Year by year, the list of major firms that
 
have at least attempted to. implement a variable program
 
continues to increase. (Bacher and Gross 1993)
 
Base pay, which is well suited to reflect the economic
 
and competitive:market value, as well as the strategic
 
i
 
value, of jobs or skills, is not an effective reward for
 
performance because it ignores the importance of [over-all :
 
organizational results. It is often viewed by employees as
 
a cost-of-living entitlement and it focuses only Ion the
 
individual and not on the team. Therefore, it cannot be
 
used as a reward for effective product and/or serjvice
 
quality, and/or customer value, which are "team sports." 
^ -'Oy-V'i ■ ■■ 'y l- . 
(Milkovich and Milkovich 1992) Variable pay or ihcentives, 
'y .■> . , ■; y;. . ' ■ ;; v.';. ,, -y:.-? , - '"-V- ' . ■ ' ■ ' y- I i ' . ly-":. 
for the very reasons that base pay increases are not well 
suited to performance recognition, fits the bill |as a strong 
performance recognition tool. It offers employees! the 
.y "y- y'y . ' '-yV'-V I 
opportunity to share in organizational success. |
!yy';y''y"..' ;; y .y- :' :"y/yyyy;y:;r1.4y 	 . 4':..'4y^'y .y i: 
The traditional annual bonus remains by far [the most 
v:" 'r:;-V ■ ■■ ■" ■ ■ 'yy 	 4;. ' -y.. yV. ' ^  ^ V ' V. iy, , -■ V' ' ' 'V--" ' ' ' 4-''y . 
frequently used form of variable compensation. Spot awards 
y. 	 .v^-4 \ 44y-4 ■, y.4v- .■ ■ ■'" ■ ■■; .. " 4^ ■4y4';.414:. 4;4,;'4^-; .;"4-y'i' . 4-' ' :4.'y4V'^'"";'4;.\: y \ '4 y4, , . i, ;■ ■. . ; ■ ■■ ■' y: ■ 
and individual incentive plans, the second and th;ird most 
frequently used type of plans, are used considerably more 
; y ■ yy'"y. ;^yyy\' y-' y/ 'y-y:^'.:y' y yVV.y y .y y -y.yy*.^'' .'4:y;y |yy- ' : ■ ■ ' ■yy y 
often outside the manufacturing sector. A company's base 
11 
salary strategy has a considerable effect on the types of
 
variable pay approaches it adopts. Companies paying below-

market levels use annual bonuses and individual incentives
 
more frequently than those in other categories. Companies
 
whose base pay levels are targeted above the market reported
 
more frequent use of spot awards as compared with other
 
categories. (Zitaner 1992)
 
While traditional variable pay is added on top of base
 
pay (add-on), new variable pay can be add-on, at risk, or
 
potential base pay at risk. If the organization reduces
 
base pay by a certain amount (e.g., five percent) and offers
 
variable amounts of pay for performance improvement, then
 
the former fixed base pay becomes at-risk variable pay. The
 
decision on which form to use is best resolved within the
 
context of setting performance targets, the overall
 
competitiveness of the organization's total compensation
 
program, and the organization's ability to pay. Normally,
 
the higher the performance standards set before variable pay
 
begins to pay out, the more likely variable pay can be add
 
on. (Whitaker 1993)
 
In order for a program to be successful, both managers
 
arid employees must be committed to it. Employees have to
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believe that the plan is not just another fad, but a fair
 
program, and that its goals are practical and achievable.
 
The plan should not be perceived as a way to make up for a
 
significantly below-average baSe pay system. Teamwork,
 
trust, and involvement at all levels are critical to a
 
plan's ultimate fate. The plan should provide an
 
opportunity for employees to earn additional rewards without
 
increasing base pay above competitive practices since it may
 
be difficult to justify the cost of an "add-on" incentive
 
plan to already high base pay levels.
 
Employees often fear an erosion of base pay when their
 
companies move into alternative rewards. They also feel
 
that they have to earn back what was previously guaranteed
 
them. The subsequent low morale often leads to reduced
 
productiyity until the variable pay plan has proven
 
worthwhile and gained the confidence of the employees.
 
(Feldman 1991)
 
Plans should be structured around clear goals,
 
unambiguous measurements, and line-of-sight linkage to
 
employee efforts. Effective employee involvement requires
 
that employees be provided with information about quality,
 
customer feedback, and results achieved. They need to have
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 power to make deGisions and changes, knowledge about work
 
processes, and rewards from results: achieved. (Schuster and
 
Zingheim:l993) Employee education, communication, and
 
training are critical.to the likelihood of success. (Bacher
 
and Gross 1993) Employees want to know how to achieve the
 
goal on which awards are based so communication about what
 
affects the measure(s) and how employees can accomplish the
 
objective(s) is critical. (Schuster and Zingheim 1993)
 
Quality is a new pay priority and an important element
 
of new variable pay. Whether quality measures are built
 
into a variable pay design depends on a variety of factors,
 
including the level of trust of employees, the degree of
 
employee pride in creating a good work product, the ability
 
to hide quality problems, the length of time between reduced
 
quality and impact on profitability, and the extent of
 
communication and employee understanding of the relationship
 
between quality and financial results. (Schuster and
 
Zingheim 1993)
 
For the best possible chance for lasting positive value
 
by making employees pa:rtners in the organization's future,
 
three key issues are: (1) Is variable pay to be add-on, at
 
risk, or potential base pay at risk? (2) How will
 
■ ' ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ ■ 1A 
 performance be measured for variable pay purposes? and (3)
 
What is the relationship between results and variable pay
 
awards? (Schuster and Zingheim 1993)
 
Measurement is key to the development of new variable
 
pay because it communicates the important outcomes that the
 
organization needs and employees can impact. What gets
 
measured and rewarded gets attention. The number of
 
measures used for variable pay should be limited to five or
 
less to ensure that the organization is communicating a
 
strong, clear message about what it wants employees to
 
accomplish. Acceptable measures of performance for;variable
 
pay are within the influence of pay plan participants and
 
most often result in bottom-line gain for the organization,
 
which is then shared with employees. Some possible measures
 
include profit, financial ratios, quality, customer
 
satisfaction, and. productivity.
 
Profit as a measure is preferable to cost or
 
productivity because profit (or the excess or revenue over
 
expense) is necessary to sustain an organization. Also, it
 
does not need interpretation in terms of trying to determine
 
what affects its performance. If profit is a measure, the
 
organization must be willing to communicate profit results
 
' ' . M5 ■'
 
and to grant awards when it meets it profit goal even if
 
employees have little to do directly with that achievement.
 
Labor-intensive organizations, where most of the cost
 
is labor, may be interested in using profit as a measure
 
because improving productivity in labor costs can leverage
 
significant gains, and because the organization cannot
 
afford to pay out an award of any meaningful size to
 
employees unless profit is at an acceptable level. It is
 
important, however, to make sure that the use of profit as a
 
measure does not communicate the wrong message to employees
 
and customers. (Schuster and Zingheim 1993)
 
Threshold sharing is the minimum level of projected
 
performance the organization must reach before any money in
 
the form of variable pay will be shared with the employees
 
participating in the plan. The threshold is close to but
 
below goal performance. The use and size of threshold
 
awards depend on the degree to which pay is at risk. The
 
more pay at risk or potential base pay at risk, the more
 
likely a threshold performance level will be used and the
 
larger the awards can be at threshold. If variable pay is
 
add-on, having threshold levels may not be appropriate
 
unless reaching a target is difficult because of tough goal
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setting or significant influence by external variables.
 
(Schuster and Zingheim 1993)
 
According to Bacher and Gross (1993), a variable pay
 
program is more likely to be successful if it includes the
 
following factors:
 
1. 	 Participation that is as broad as possible and that
 
encourages team efforts, rather than singling out
 
selected groups or individuals.
 
2. 	 Measurement that is quantitative, simple, and
 
structured to permit a line of sight to the desired
 
work 	outcome.
 
3. 	 Baselines that are determined through a collaborative
 
effort, with as many viewpoints considered as possible,
 
rather than engineered and imposed by an unseen or
 
unchallenged source.
 
4. 	 Timing of measurements and payout that is shorter
 
rather than longer.
 
5. 	 Employee risk that is lower rather than higher.
 
6. 	 Awards that are large enough to make a real difference
 
to employees. One month's pay is an award size typical
 
of successful plans, but can vary from five to 100
 
percent of base salary.
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Merit Pay
 
: widely used plan for managing
 
performance. The message of merit pay is that individual
 
employees ma.tter; that is, they can make a differdrice and
 
that difference is valued and recognized with pay.' Most
 
managers believe that merit pay fits into an overall human
 
resources system that emphasizes meritocracy as the basis
 
for making pay and promotion decisions. Merit pay typically
 
combines individual performance evaluation with corporate-

wide guidelines that translate a specific performance rating
 
and position in the pay range into an increase percentage.
 
These guidelines control costs and ensure consistent
 
treatment across organizational units. While managers are
 
certainly concerned with the accuracy and fairness of the
 
measurement, of greater concern is how employees feel at the
 
end of the appraisal process and how these feeling affect
 
their subsequent work behavior. Studies of job satisfaction
 
and performance indicate that these may be positively
 
affected by merit pay. (Milkovich and Milkovich 1992)
 
The design and administration of most merit plans call
 
for yearly performance evaluations and pay adjustments.
 
Sometimes this long time frame makes it hard for employees
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to connect today's pay with meritorious behavior that
 
occurred months ago. In addition, an annual increase
 
results in only a small change in weekly paycheck. The
 
difference between the pay increase for employees whose
 
performance was exemplary and that for employees whose
 
performance was average was not enough to motivate
 
performance at a higher level. Many employees and managers
 
do not realize the financial impact of rolling increases
 
into a base each year. The extra pay, however small, recurs
 
in every year that the employee stays at the job.
 
Employees need to realize that merit increases should be
 
viewed in the context of their entire career because of
 
their continuing effect on pay and not an insignificant
 
small percentage increase in pay. (Milkovich,and Milkovich
 
1992)
 
A lump sum merit program allows employers to reward
 
performance but not get stuck with an increase in base
 
salaries. Usually, it is the same amount that the employee
 
would get as a merit raise, only it is given all at one,
 
eliminating a permanent raise.
 
There is a growing belief that merit pay is mismanaged:
 
Too much money is going to too many people with too little
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effect on their performance or productivity. The heart of
 
the problem lies in the way merit pay is managed - as a cost
 
control, not a motivational mechanism. If performance
 
motivation, rather than cost control, were an objective,
 
then more attention would be devoted to designing merit
 
grids that motivate employees. (Milkovich and Milkovich
 
19:92)
 
Individual Incentives and Goal Setting
 
Individual incentive systems, such as commissions or
 
piece rates, avoid the pitfalls of performance evaluation by
 
using objective measures to calculate pay. Properly
 
structured incentive plans meet many of the conditions that
 
psychological theory requires for pay to affect performance.
 
The aecomplishment of performance goals requires behaviors
 
and conditions that are under the control of the individual,
 
the payment is clearly linked to goal achievement, and the
 
payment is big enough to justify the effort required to
 
reach the goal. These three issues - line of sight, clear
 
message, and meaningful increases are crucial to the success
 
of an incentive plan. (Milkovich and Milkovich 1992)
 
Goals and incentives, if used properly, are valuable
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 tools for increasing productivity. Linking an individual's
 
pay to his or her performance can significantly increase
 
that performance. As a whole, the large body of research
 
provides substantial, highly convincing evidence that piece-

rate arrangements, gainsharing, and similar systems result
 
in higher productivity. (Sullivan 1991) Research shows that
 
increases in productivity of up to thirty percent can be
 
obtained through the use of properly structured incentives.
 
An "incentive" is something that incites or has a
 
tendency to incite to determination or action. An
 
opportunity to gain a promotion through demonstrating
 
proficiency and effectiveness in a given position would be a
 
form of incentive. (Cumming 1994) They provide
 
opportunities to earn and receive tangible symbols of
 
success. Individual incentives appear to work best when
 
they are applied to structured jobs where employees work
 
mostly by themselves. (Milkovich and Milkovich 1992)
 
According to goal-settihg theory, monetary incentives
 
also play an important role in determining task performance
 
by (1) encouraging individuals to set higher goals, (2)
 
causing individuals to set goals spontaneously when they
 
would not have done so otherwise, and/or (3) increasing
 
■ 21 . 
individuals' commitment to achieving a goal. (Wright 1994)
 
Specific goals lead to higher performance than easy or "do
 
your best" goals. Such goals boost individuals' efforts,
 
increase their persistence, direct their attention, and
 
cause them to develop strategies for goal attainment.
 
(Wright 1994)
 
Goal-setting/incentive schemes can be both beneficial
 
and destructive. Their effect depends on how they are used.
 
According to Wright, two motivational techniques, goal
 
setting and monetary incentives, have proven extremely
 
effective in motivating higher performance, but these
 
techniques can also produce disastrous consequences for
 
those who mishandle them. (Wright, 1994) They can actually
 
work too well and produce counterproductive effects.
 
Incentives can also motivate unethical as well as ethical
 
behavior. (Milkovich and Milkovich 1992) When managers
 
misapply goals and incentives, negative conseqnences can
 
occur. It is their misapplication that causes the negative
 
results. (Wright 1994)
 
In real-world situations, the unintended negative
 
effects of imposing individual incentives are well
 
documented. Employees won't bother doing job tasks if
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these tasks are not the basis for payments even though they
 
are part of the job. Goals, particularly when tied to
 
incentives, can create a "goal only" mentality, whereby
 
individuals focus all of their time and energy on the goal-

driven task and fail to perform other behaviors that may be
 
quite important. A high commitment to goals coupled with
 
bonuses for goal attainment was strongly negatively related
 
to helping behavior. (Wright 1994) Some individuals will
 
even attempt to sabotage coworkers. Numerous studies have
 
documented clashes between high producers and other members
 
of a work group. Such clashes appear to be motivated by
 
fear of new, higher performance standards or even of job
 
loss. (Milkovich and Milkovich 1992)
 
Individuals make Systematic trade-offs between quantity
 
and quality: When they are assigned difficult goals, they
 
may increase their effort in pursuit of quantitative
 
performance, but this increased effort will entail quality
 
costs. (Wright 1994)
 
Individuals have a tendency to continue to do things
 
the same way, regardless of whether this is the most
 
effective course of action. One of the major problems with
 
goal setting and particularly with setting difficult goals,
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is that it can produce a dysfunctional inertia, encouraging
 
individuals to cling to ineffective approaches rather than
 
developing better ways of doing things. Goals can inhibit
 
task revision and the inertia effect often results in an
 
escalation of resources committed to a failing course of
 
action. (Wright 1994)
 
The most dangerous potential pitfall of goal-setting
 
and incentive programs is their tendency to encourage
 
individuals to develop strategies that are destructive to
 
the organization. Individuals assigned to goal/incentive
 
systems engage in impression-management tactics: They seek
 
to convince others of their lack of ability in an effort to
 
justify setting what are actually easy goals. Even when
 
individuals know their bonus will not be based on a goal
 
they set by themselves, they still seek to negotiate easier
 
goals. When individuals are assigned goal-based bonuses, an
 
inverted-U relationship exists between goals and
 
performance, with the lowest performance observed among
 
those assigned the most difficult goals. It appears that
 
when individuals are assigned difficult goals under a goal-

based incentive scheme, many simply reject them and set much
 
lower, personal goals.
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Where employees trust management to set fair standards
 
and do not fear losing their jobs, individual incentives can
 
have a positive effect on individual performance. But few
 
jobs completely fulfill the conditions that psychological
 
theories require for individual incentives to affect
 
performance. Most work is complex, and most tasks
 
interdependent thus it is not surprising that surveys of
 
compensation managers report tremendous interest in group
 
incentives to influence group performance. (Milkovich and
 
Milkovich 1992)
 
Incentives based on the behavioral conditioning model
 
seldom, if ever, work very effectively. Companies are
 
restructuring their incentive programs to serve more as a
 
means of recognizing employee contributions than as a bribe
 
to get employees to do things they would otherwise not want
 
to do. (Gumming 1994)
 
There are several considerations when using goals and
 
incentives. First,, incentives should not be tied to goal
 
attainment. Goal-driven incentives can cause employees to
 
set lower goal levels, reject difficult goals, and over
 
emphasize goal attainment regardless of the organizational,
 
social, or ethical costs. It is possible to use incentives
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in conjunction with goals. An ideal motivational program
 
would direct supervisors and employees to agree on
 
performance goals based on the employee's ability and the
 
organization's needs. The reward system would then reward
 
performance, regardless of the individual's ability.
 
Rewards must be tied to absolute levels of performance,
 
rather than to increases in performance relative to an
 
individual's ability or past accomplishments. Equity occurs
 
naturally with piece-rate systems. The goals motivate
 
individuals to increase their own level of performance, the
 
incentives reward performance based on the contribution that
 
performance makes to organizational success. (Wright 1994)
 
It must be remembered that the same goal is not equally
 
difficult for all and the goal, therefore, will likely
 
motivate only a very few individuals to achieve higher
 
performance. The key to effective goal setting is to decide
 
upon goals that encourage employees to improve their
 
performance - but not at the expense of other important
 
aspects of the job. Each employee's goals should differ
 
from those of other employees, because they should reflect
 
that individual's own capabilities. The best goal-setting
 
process calls for managers and employees to agree on goals
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that will be challenging but will by no means require an
 
individual to devote all of his or her energy and attention
 
to achieving them. (Wright 1994)
 
Goals should be set for ^11 performance-related
 
activities. When only one goal exists, employees will often
 
seek to reach only that goal, ignoring other important
 
performance-related activities. Thus, a key challenge for
 
managers is to set goals for all major aspects of job
 
performance. In Order to do this, the manager must first
 
identify all important performance-related activities.
 
Then, goals are set for each activity, regardless of whether
 
the goal can be measured objectively. Finally, the manager
 
should prioritize the employee's goals to demonstrate how
 
each contributes to the organization's success. (Wright
 
1994)
 
Once they have agreed on a goal or set of goals, the
 
manager and employee need to specify the means for attaining
 
them, keying in on the most effective, efficient, and
 
ethical strategies. They must then constantly evaluate
 
these strategies to ensure their efficacy. If the chosen
 
strategies falter, the manager and employee must devise new
 
ones. When individuals are told to pay attention to what
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they should do (i.e., the task strategy), as opposed to how
 
much they should do, their effectiveness increases. (Wright
 
1994)
 
Gumming (1994) outlines the following simple principles
 
which can help guide the design of effective incentives and
 
avoid incentives that can actually prove counterproductive:
 
1. 	 Attainment of incentive goals should have obvious value
 
to the organization, and the participants should be
 
fully aware of how this value will result from their
 
efforts.
 
2. 	 Incentive goals should be consistent with the overall
 
strategy and vision of the organization.
 
3. 	 The organization should be aligned to support the
 
processes and results the incentive awards are
 
emphasizing.
 
4. 	 The results on which incentive awards will be based
 
should be objectively measurable and clearly set forth
 
beforehand.
 
5. 	 The attainment of incentive goals should appear
 
realistic and at least partially under the control of
 
the participants.
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Piece Rate Incentives
 
Incentive workers, or piece-rate workers, are often
 
viewed as producers of poor quality work, while nonincentive
 
workers are viewed as "slow and lazy." Piece-rate incentive
 
systems have a long history in American industry. They
 
became popular when Frederick Taylor's approach to work
 
simplification became the standard organizing concept for
 
American businesses. Piece-rate incentive systems are based
 
on the premise that if jobs involve simple tasks, then the ;
 
incentive plan would motivate workers to produce maximum
 
units.
 
Firms with piece rate systems, however, frequently find
 
significant organizational problems. For instance,
 
employees and managers were frequently in conflict about
 
work priorities. The employees may be more concerned with
 
producing the number of units needed to earn their desired
 
incentive pay than to produce units of superior quality or
 
meet the customer's delivery requirements. Secondly,
 
attempts to introduce new technology or innovative processes
 
may fail. Employees are sometimes reluctant to accept such
 
changes unless management can demonstrate how they could
 
earn more incentive pay with these changes.
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Piece-rate incentive systerns may cause employees to
 
distrust managers and vise versa. Employees may feel that
 
they need to be protected from being exploited by managers.
 
Supervisors may feel that employees constantly had to feel
 
threatened to meet quality objectives and delivery
 
schedules. Supervisors may also feel that:they can not
 
manage employee performance. If a worker does not work to
 
standard, the supervisor may feel powerless and if an
 
employee produces a better-than-average-rate,;they didn't
 
have the tools to reward superior performance.
 
Consequently, supervisors must rely on threats and .
 
punishment to manage performance. (Wilson 1992)
 
Quality improvement efforts frequently are seen as
 
management's job. Workers fear that the consequences of
 
implementing such ideas might be an increase in their work
 
standards. Preventive maintenance may be ignored as may be
 
process changes in order to minimize the negative impact on
 
employees. Because the piece,rate incentive system is based
 
on the number of units produced, there is little reward for
 
quality, delivery, or the efficient use of labor, materials,
 
and related costs. Employees and supervisors care about the
 
success of the business, but they seldom found meaningful
 
 solutions to problems. These patterns of self-interest,
 
mutual distrust, and resistance to change emerged from a
 
long history of ineffective management systems and
 
practices. Employees kept just ahead of their production
 
quotas and the supervisors spent most of their time chasing
 
and correcting problems. Both felt powerless to change.
 
Fear and reinforcement of self interests ruled these
 
workplaces and many others like them. (Wilson 1992)
 
There are, however, beneficial features of the piece
 
work incentive pay programs, such as the following.
 
Employees know what they need to do and the tasks and
 
performance standards are clear and well-communicated to
 
them. Feedback is specific, immediate, meaningful, and
 
clearly related to performance. Employees always know how
 
well they are performing, feven if the company does not
 
provide feedback, the employees often invent their own
 
feedback system. Employees have a sense of control over
 
what they do and the pace at which they do it. If they want
 
to work hard and earn a large check, they can. If they want
 
to operate at a slower pace, they can do that as well.
 
There are clear consequences to employee performance.
 
Higher output results in higher pay; lower output results in
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lower pay. Since consequences are specific, directly
 
related to individual actions, and usually meaningful.
 
The employee often invents processes to improve
 
productivity. Frequently, however, they are not encouraged
 
to share this know-how with cpworkers and hence, the "tricks
 
of the trade" are not used by the overall organization to
 
increase its competitiveness in the marketplace. This is
 
positive to the employee but inhibits the organization's
 
ability to compete. In effect, employees are in business
 
for themselves and may consider the company to be the
 
competitor. This may be one reason for moving from piece
 
work to gainsharing or team incentives. (Wilson 1992)
 
Team Incentive Plans
 
An increasing number of organizations are turning to
 
team incentive plans because they realize that
 
individualized incentives are often out of sync with a work
 
culture that relies on team-work and group commitment to
 
achieve a common set of goals. (Gumming, 1994) In addition,
 
companies are seeking new ways to increase flexibility,
 
encourage innovation, increase quality, and combat turnover
 
and absenteeism. Too often the emphasis is on individual
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competition in situations where collective effort toward a
 
common goal is critical. If team incentive plans are to be
 
implemented, managers must rethink traditional reward
 
systems which are oriented toward rewarding individuals.
 
Because everybody in the team is affected by the outcome,
 
high producers will work with and encourage the low
 
producers to keep them up to the performance standards.
 
(Bartol and Hagmann 1992)
 
When responsibility for integrating multiple task
 
outcomes is transferred from a single boss to a team of
 
workers, it allows workers to better understand how their
 
performance affects the Organization as a whole and provides
 
them the opportunity to gain intrinsic satisfaction from
 
knowing that their work has made a real difference and has
 
added real value. Incentives that are structured to
 
reinforce employee perceptions of creating value will serve
 
to enhance their level of intrinsic satisfaction rather than
 
replace it.
 
What makes a particular group or team incentive
 
effective is not simply the fact that it is based on group
 
rather than individual results, but that it has been tied to
 
results or accomplishments that, by themselves, can be
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viewed by participants as evidence of their success.
 
Incentive awards that are a source of pride, that cause
 
others to view the recipients with respect, and that
 
communicate tangible appreciation for what has been
 
accomplished will engender feelings of good will and
 
commitment on the part of the recipients toward the
 
organization. These feelings are quite different from the
 
feelings of bitterness that may result when employees feel
 
they are being manipulated by incentives to perform work
 
they would otherwise be unwilling to perform. (Gumming 1994)
 
Companies that wish to implement a work-team concept
 
face a dual challenge in designing pay systems for the
 
teams. They must design pay plans that not only reward and
 
motivate employees but also encourage the worker involvement
 
and cooperation needed for teamwork.
 
Group incentive systems typically provide for uniform
 
awards to all members of a formally established group on the
 
basis of their collective achievement of a predetermined
 
objective. Generally, there are two basic types of group
 
incentive plans: gainsharing and profit sharing. The
 
typical gainsharing plan focuses on production cost savings
 
as the performance measure at team or facility levels.
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Profit-sharing plans focus on changes in profitability as
 
the performance measure and a portion of profits above a
 
targeted level is distributed among employees, generally as
 
a percentage of base salary. (Milkovich and Milkovich 1992)
 
Gainsharing provides an opportunity for employees to
 
share in the gains realized by the company from their
 
efforts. It is usually employed to increase production
 
volumes. Gains ar.e shared with all employees in a defined
 
unit, according to a predetermined formula, calculated on
 
the value of production over labor and other costs.
 
Milkovich and Milkovich (1992) discuss the fact that a
 
number of case studies and surveys report impressive
 
increases in performance connected with the introduction of
 
gainsharing. By and large the reports agreed that the
 
introduction of a gainsharing plan initially increased
 
employee suggestions for work improvements, reduced costs,
 
led to improved quality, and fostered more cooperative
 
employee-management relations. Those plans where
 
improvement in productivity did not occur were hampered by
 
infrequent bonus payouts, poor union-management relations
 
before and during the study period, and a lack of employee
 
input into the plan design and production standards.
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Productivity improved and labor costs and grievance rates
 
declined after introduction of gainsharing.
 
Gainsharing can result in an increase in productivity
 
that can be sustained over a long time, but gainsharing must
 
be part of an overall approach to human resources that is
 
built on solid employee relations and that emphasizes
 
employee participation in decision making. Employee
 
involvement in the design and administration of a
 
gainsharing plan is crucial to its success.
 
A performance management system must involve
 
implementation of effective performance tracking as well as
 
feedback on a daily, weekly, and monthly basis. Progress
 
reports should be given to employees during the performance
 
period as opposed to waiting until the period closed as this
 
enables employees to make immediate adjustments to improve
 
their performance record.
 
Under a profit sharing plan employee rewards are tied
 
to the company's overall yearly profit. Profit sharing can
 
provide potential benefits including improved employee
 
commitment to and understanding of the firm's business. A
 
problem is that the "line-of-sight" is often obscure. very
 
few employees see a direct connection between their behavior
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and their firm's profits. Forces inside the organization as
 
well as outside weaken the link between individual work
 
behavior and corporate profits, particularly for lower-level
 
employees. Milkovich and Milkovich cited research that
 
concluded that managerial bbnuses and profit sharing can
 
affect corporate performance.
 
Summary
 
Each organization must tailor a specific performance
 
based pay program that is compatible with it's environment,
 
that meets corporate policies and supports the overall
 
philosophy and intentions of the company, and ensures fair
 
employee relations. Employee involvement in the design of
 
the program is critical as well as a system of ongoing
 
communication with employees Management must ensure a
 
consistent and timely method of measuring productivity and
 
performance that is objective and communicated to employees.
 
A pay system that is consistent with the company's approach
 
to managing human resources communicates the organization's
 
philosophy and values and strengthens the link between
 
behaviors and rewards.
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CHAPTER 3 - METHODOLOGY
 
Design of the Study
 
The study whs a retrospective case comparison with the
 
purpose of com^ variables before and after the
 
event of implementation of pay-per-visit. The sample was a
 
sample of convenience as defined below. The sample
 
population served as its own control group in that the same
 
nurses were used in both the "before" and "after" sample.
 
The group was used as the control group before
 
implementation of pay-per-visit when they were being paid on
 
an hourly basis as they had been since employment. The
 
introduction of pay-per-visit was the variable that was
 
theorized as having an effect on the behavior of the nurses.
 
Each nurse could then be compared to themselves as well as
 
the group compared to itself.
 
The data obtained from the study was qualitative and
 
nonparametric. Descriptive statistics and analysis was used
 
to analyze and discuss the findings.
 
A sample of convenience was used for the purposes of
 
this study. The sample of nurses was defined as registered
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nurses who were employed by Ramona VNA and Hospice for at
 
least nine months prior to implementation of pay-per-visit
 
as well as nine months after the change from their hourly
 
method of pay to pay-per-visit.
 
Ramona VNA and Hospice has three branch offices, one of
 
which has never converted to pay-per-visit. Therefore, the
 
nurses in that branch were not selected as part of the
 
sample population. Also, nurses who work in the Hospice
 
program were not selected, because they have not converted
 
to pay-per-visit. The total sample consisted of seventeen
 
nurses. Each nurse chosen for the sample was listed
 
alphabetically and consecutively assigned a number from one
 
(1) to seventeen (17).
 
Methods and Procedures
 
A comparison was made of variables related to home
 
health nurses' behavior and productivity when they were paid
 
on an hourly rate before the implementation of pay-per-visit
 
and after pay-per-visit was implemented. The purpose of
 
looking at the particular variables chosen was to determine
 
which factors or behaviors changed when pay-per-visit was
 
implemented and when there was a change, whether the change
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was positive or negative for the home health agency.
 
The comparison was made using registered nurses
 
employed by Ramona VNA and Hospice in Hemet, California who
 
were employed both before and after implementation of a pay-

per-visit system.
 
The variables considered included:
 
1. 	 Nurses' productivity.
 
2. 	 Nurses' patient-care related time per billable visit.
 
3. 	 The length of a nursing visit.
 
4. 	 The amount of time nurses spent in Patient Care
 
Conferences.
 
5. 	 The amount of time nurses spent in inservices and staff
 
meetings.
 
6. 	 The number of miles driven per billable visit made.
 
The first step in answering the above questions was to
 
determine what data was needed to provide the information to
 
be used for comparison. It was decided that data pertaining
 
to the work practices of the sample nurses would be
 
retrospectively gathered. The period of time to be looked
 
at was determined to be the nine months prior to
 
implementation of pay-per-visit and the nine months after
 
the implementation of pay-per-visit. Since pay-per-visit
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was implemented on August 1, 1994, the nine month period
 
prior to implementation was defined as November 1, 1993 to
 
July 31, 1994. The nine month period following the
 
implementation of pay-per-visit was defined as August 1,
 
1994 to April 30, 1995.
 
Thirty dates were randomly selected within each nine
 
month period using Quattro Pro. A total of sixty dates was
 
selected. Data was then gathered from the work records of
 
each nurse for each of the sixty days that they worked.
 
Depending on the part-time or full-time status of each
 
nurse, they all worked different numbers of days within the
 
sixty randomly selected dates.
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The relative number of days that each nurse worked out 
of the thirty randomly selected dates before and after 
implementation of pay per visit was fairly consistent for 
each nurse. The result was that the comparison for each 
nurse was based on approximately the same amouht of data 
before and after implementation of pay-per-visit. 
Each of the variables to be considered was further 
defined and formulas were developed to calculate each one 
mathematically. Data elements needed to compute the 
formulas were identified. The following table defines each 
■ ■ 42 'V 
variable and the data elements needed.
 
TABLE 2
 
DEFINITION OF VARIABLES
 
DATA ELEMENTS 
REQUIRED FROM 
VARIABLE DESCRIPTION FORMULA ROUTESHEET 
Productivity Number of billable visits a. Total hours worked a. Total hours worked 
made per 8 hours 8 = number of8 b. Number of billable 
hour days worked. visits. 
b. Total billable visits 
made -r- 8 hour days 
worked. 
Patient care time All time spent performing Patient care time a. Total ofthe following 
per billable visit activities related topatient billable visits unless specified as 
care, Inlcudes all patient non-patient care 
visits, both billable and related: 
hpn-billable, travel, ^ Subtotalpatient hours 
charting, and care Charting 
coordination time. Office/other out of 
Excludes time spent in office/other 
inservices, meetings, and Travel time 
other non- patient care Breaks 
related activities: 
b • Nunaber of billable 
visits 
Length of visit Actual time spent in the Total billable patient visit a. Total of "Total time" 
patient's home plus travel time billable visits for each billable visit 
time b. Number of billable 
visits made 
Time spent in Time spent in format Total hours spent in a. Patient Care 
Patient Conferences patient care conferences Patient Care Conferences Conference time 
billable visits b. Number of billable 
visits 
Time spent in Time spent in approved Total hours spent in a. Total of: 
inservices or staff inservices and staff inservices and staff Agency 
meetings meetings whether meetings -J- billable visits meetings/Inservice 
mandatory or voluntary. b. Number of billable 
visits made 
Miles Number of miles driven Miles billable visits a. Patient care miles 
for patient care related b. Number of billable 
purposes visits 
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This inforraation was obtained from the Service Personnel
 
Route and Time Sheets that the nurses complete each day that
 
they work. (See Appendix for sample Route and Time Sheet.)
 
Work records were retrieved for each of the sample nurses
 
for each of the randomly selected dates that the nurses
 
worked. Each of the necessary data elements was retrieved
 
and recorded for each day that each nurse worked during the
 
defined periods of time. The information was recorded on
 
Data Collection Worksheets (See appendix for sample Data
 
Collection Worksheet). Two worksheets were set up for each
 
nurse, one to record data before implementation of pay-per­
visit and the other to record data after implementation.
 
After the data was collected for each day worked, the data
 
elements were totaled.
 
The second aspect of the study was to determine the
 
nurses' level of satisfaction and perception of fair
 
compensation with pay-per-visit. A survey was conducted of
 
the nurses in the sample to determine whether they feel
 
satisfied with the pay-per-visit system compared to the
 
previous system of hourly compensation. The survey included
 
questions pertaining to their feelings about fair
 
compensation as well as quality of patient care (See
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appendix for sample survey). Each question was developed
 
using a five point Likert Scale.
 
Analvsis of the Data
 
After the data was collected, it was entered into a
 
spread sheet format in order to tabulate and analyze the
 
data to produce tables and graphs. The data elements
 
described in Table 2 wereused to calculate the variables to
 
be compared before implementation of pay-per-visit and
 
after. The formulas were also entered into the spread sheet
 
so that the table included the results. One table was
 
prepared for the data collected relative to before
 
implementation of pay-per-visit and one was prepared for the
 
data collected relative to after implementation of pay-per­
visit. Tables and graphs were developed to compare each
 
variable for each nurse. Descriptive statistics were used
 
to describe the differences between the variables before and
 
after implementation of pay-per-visit.
 
Data from the survey was collected and tabulated and the
 
mean and standard deviation were determined for each
 
question.
 
45
 
CHAPTER 4 - FINDINGS
 
Introduction
 
The purpose of this study was to determine the answers
 
to the questions, (1) Is there a difference in nursing
 
productivity as a result of implementing pay-per-visit, (2)
 
Is there a difference in the direct cost of a nursing visit
 
between hourly and pay-per-visit systems, (3) Is there a
 
difference in the length of time nurses spend in patients'
 
homes when nurses are paid per visit as opposed to hourly,
 
(4) Is there a difference in the amount of time spent by
 
nurses in patient care conferences when they are paid per
 
visit, (5) Is there a difference in the amount of time spent
 
in inservices and staff meetings when nurses are paid per
 
visit, (6) Are nurses satisfied with pay-per-visit and do
 
they want to continue or would they prefer to return to
 
hourly pay, (7) Do nurses feel that they are receiving fair
 
and equitable compensation with pay-per-visit, and (8) Do
 
nurses feel that quality of care is jeopardized by a pay-

per-visit system. Findings for these questions are included
 
in this chapter. Also included with these findings are data
 
related to the variables used to answer the questions.
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Data Collected
 
The study sample consisted of seventeen (17) nurses who
 
were employed at Ramona VNA and Hospice for at least nine ,
 
months prior to and nine months after implementation of pay-

per-visit. Data was collected from a review of the nurses'
 
Route and Time Sheets for the days randomly selected to be
 
part of the study. The data was entered into tables showing
 
the findings for each of the variables collected for each of
 
the nurses in the study. Table 3 shows the data collected
 
pertaining to the days studied before implementation of pay-

per-visit.
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 Table 3. Data Before Implementation of Pay-per-VisIt
 
Nurse# 
Total 
Hours 
iiiiiiill Patient 
Visit In
Hours in 
service/Staff 
iiiiliil 
iipiipli 
Number of 
8 hour 
Worked Time BftiiiliB Meetings Days 
1 iiiiliiiiili 280.50 131.50 iiiiiiiiiiSl 10.00 35.06 
2 BiilB 225.50 131.00 BBBIBI®! 12.00 28.19 
3 208.00 115.75 17.75 26.00 
4 iiliilii 
5 llllilii 
6 iiillPil 
199.50 90.50 
90.75 46.00 iiiiiiilB 
109.00 55.25 
2.25 ,,„„482 
0.00 
7.75 
24.94 
11.34 
13.63 
7 iiiiiii 28.25 14.75 1.50 3.53 
8 iiiiiii 
9 iiiiill 
218.75 117.25 iBBBBIili 
3.50 3.25 liiiHiiii 
7.00 ww 
0.00 
27.34 
0.44 
10 iiiiiiiiili 
11 iiiilB 
127.75 75.00 MBIBIiii 
214.50 94.50 oil 
4.50 
13.50 
15.97 
26.81 
12 iiliii 
13 IBiB 
216.25 mr&i 118.25 
157.25 84.50 
liiii 9.50 
5.50 
27.03 
19.66 
14 45 
15 IBIIlBii 
77.25 55.00 ilBlBiiii 
160.50 83.50 iiiiiiiliiiiii 
■ 3.50 
4.00 
9.66 
20.06 
16 BIBili 222.25 114.75 liBliliii 6.25 27.78 
17 223.50 151.00 13.25 27.94 
Totalsi^MK 2,763.00 BiB 1,481.75 172$ 118.25 <0,442 345.38 
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Table 4 shows the data collected which pertains to the
 
days studied after implementation of pay-per-visit.
 
Table 4. Data After Implementation of Pay-per-Visit
 
Total liilBB Patient Hours in Number of 
Nurse# Hours Visit team: Inseivice/Staff 8 hour 
Worked iiBiiiii Time Meetings Days 
1 257.75 ipillll 63.25 2.25 32.22 
2 160.00 114.00 3.50 20.00 
3 68.00 60.25 1.00 8.50 
4 155.00 iiiliii 74.50 1.23 0.00 19.38 
5 123.75 67.25 0.00 15.47 
6 73.25 iiiiiiii 42.50 2.0Q 2.00 9.16 
7 
8 liiiili 20.50 102.75 19.75 67.00 0.00 1.00 2.56 12.84 
9 iiiiliBi 15.00 13.25 0.00 1.88 
10 iiliiiii 162.05 100.75 2,25 4.25 ^1 20.26 
11 166.25 136.50 2.00 20.78 
12 124 189.00 127.75 0^{3i0 4.50 23.63 
13 illiiiilil 
14 liliiiilipl 
69.75 
69.50 
36.00 
54.00 
2.25 
0.00 
2S3 8.72 
8.69 
15 148.25 95.75 1.50 18.53 
16 199.75 107.75 3.00 24.97 
17 177.75 ■^P 135.50 3.00 22.22 
Totals Biiliiil 2,158.30 2,110,30 1,315.75 30.25 $.444 269.81 
During the thirty days randomly selected before 
implementation of pay-per-visit the nurses worked a total of 
2,765 hours. During the thirty days randomly selected after 
implementation of pay-per-visit they worked 2,160 hours. 
This translates to a total of 345.6 eight hour days worked 
before and 270 eight hour days worked after implementation 
of pay-per-visit. During the days studied, a total of 1,426 
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billable visits were made before and 1433 were made after
 
implementation of pay per visit. The following graphs show
 
the data for each nurse with a comparison of before and
 
after implementation of pay-per-visit.
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 Graph 5. Hours in Team Conference
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Graph 6. Time in inservices
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After the data was collected and a calculation was made
 
to determine the number of eight hour days each nurse worked
 
on the days studied, the variables being studied were
 
calculated in order to state them in useable terms. For
 
example, it was determined how many visits were made for
 
every eight hours that the nurses worked. Patient care
 
related time was looked at in terms of the time per visit.
 
The following tables show each of the variables that would
 
be used to answer the research questions.
 
Tables. Calculated Variables Before Pay-per-Vlsit
 
Patient
 
Nurse# Care Conference Average
iBIilili iiiiiiiBiiii
 
Time per Time per8 Miles per
 
iiilBili Visit Hours Worked liiililMiKil
 Visit
 
1 1.72 0.02 6.85
 
2 iiiiliili 1.74 iHliiiliii 0.15 iiiiiiiiMIBi 9.20
 
3 iiiiilil
 2.21 0.00 9.12
liiiiBP
 
. . 4 IlllPliiii 1.72 0.04 0Q9 4.23
 
5 1.71 0.00 7.66
iilBil liiiPiiiiiiiB
 
lipiiBi
6 440 1.62 0.15 5.40
 
7 423 1.78 iiiiifiiii 0.00 iiiiiilP 10.40
 
8 1:96
 0.04 iiiiBlBiiii 5.57
 
9 1.17 0.00 9.00
iipiljiip iiiii ''''''5=00
 
4.35
10 Illll 1.64 iiiiiiiiii 0.13
 
11 2.34 ilHIliP 0.00 10.98
 
1.89 0.11
 9.09
12 IIIPIII liiiiiiilK liiiyiiiiiM

iiiio.95
13 1.71 0.00 5.44
 
14 1.64 Miiiiiiiii 0.00 9.82
 
15 1.86 0.11 6.99
iiPiiii
 
16 ppiiiii 189 iiililiiiii 0.00 028 4.82
 
17 1.63 0.04 047 8.09
 
Average ■■■lii 1 78 liiiili 0.06 032 7.47
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Table 6. Calculated Variables After Pay■-per-Visit 
Patient 
Nurse # Care ConferenceBiliIBi IliHilPiiHi Average 
Time per Time per 8 Miles perilillBiiil 
iiiiiilii Visit iiiiiii Hours Worked Visit 
1 1.48 0:$-7 0.08 iiiiiiiiiiili 5.98 
2 liiiPP 1.52 iBliiilli 0.00 0 18 8.36 
3 1.24 0.00 iliiiiiiiiiiii 10.35 
4 lillHH 1.67 iillBIBi 0.06 0 00 5.49 
5 1.43 iiiiiiiiii 0.06 OrOO 7.12 
iiliP iiilipiji6 1.21 0.22 022 5.95 
7 Biiiiii 1.03 liiiB 0.00 iilHIii o'oo' 3.40 
8 1.55 0.16 5.22iiilH iiiiiP 
9 1.36 111111111111 0.00 Iiliiii 14.18 
10 S- !2-3 1.46 095 0.11 iilBlililiiiiiii 6.14 
11 liiiiiiB 1.61 1.34 0.00 cuo 9.96 
12 1.49 0.00 010 7.08liiiPii liiiiB 
13 iiliiii 1.44 iiiiiiiil 0.00 6.02 
14 1.51 0.00 000 7.80iliiiiP 
15 1.51 iilHiiil 0.08 7.03 
16 1.53 0.17 012 4.87iiiiiiPji IiiiiP 
17 1.37 0.05 3.98ililiiiii liiiiili
 
Average illiiil 144 iiliiii 0,0S| OM
 
Productivity 
Productivity, which is stated in terms of average 
biliable visits made per each eight hour day worked, is 
reflected in Graph 9. The graph shows the productivity of 
each nurse with a comparison of before and after 
implementation of pay-per-visit. Average productivity 
increased 27%, from a mean of 4.36 visits per eight hours 
worked to a mean of 5.54 visits per eight hours worked. All 
but one of the individual nurses showed an increase in 
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 productivity. The one nurse who had a decrease in
 
Productivity worked the least amount of time which was 3.5
 
hours before and fifteen hours after implementation of pay-

per-visit.
 
Graph s. Visits per8 Hours Worked
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Patient Care Related Time
 
Patient care related time which includes the actual
 
visits and all preparation and follow-up activities
 
decreased 22% from a mean of 1.76 hours/visit before
 
implementation of pay-per-visit to 1.44 hours/visit after
 
implementation of pay-per-visit. All but one nurse showed a
 
decrease, again the nurse who had an increase in patient
 
care related time was the one who worked very little during
 
the study time frame. Graph 10 shows patient care related
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time fot each nurse, contrasting before and after
 
implementation of pay-per-visit.
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Length of Patient Visit
 
Twelve nurses showed a decrease and five showed an
 
increase in the length of their patient visits Patient
 
visit time includes the actual time spent in the patient's
 
home plus travel time. The mean length of nursing visits
 
decreased after implementation of pay-per-visit by 8%. The
 
mean length of patient visits before pay-per-visit was 1.04
 
hours/visit while the mean length of the visits after imple
 
mentation of pay-per-visit was 0.96 hours/visit. Graph 11
 
shows average patient visit time for each nurse, contrasting
 
before and after implementation of pay-per-visit.
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since patient visit time includes ttave timei, mileage
 
data was collectedv^i to compare tHe miles per visit
 
before and after implementation of pa^rper-visit. Average
 
miles per visit changed less than one half mile per visit,
 
from 7.47 to 7.0. See 12.
 
Graph 11. VisitTirne per Visit
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Graph 12. Average Miles per Visit
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Patient Conference and Inservice Time
 
Time spent in patient conferences, inservices, and
 
staff meetings;w measured in terms of hpurs per eight
 
hours worked. Time spent in patient conferences changed very
 
littTe after impTementatiOn of pay per visit showing an
 
increase from and average of 0.5 hours/eight hours worked to
 
0.6 hours/eight hours worked. However, the amount of time 
the nurses spent in inservices and staff meetings decreased 
markedly. The mean amount of time decreased from .32 
hours/eight hours worked to ■ ^10 hours/eight hours worked. ; 
This is a decrease of 69%. See Graph 14. 
Graph 13. Conference Time
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 Graph 14. Inservice Time
 
0.8
 
CO 0.6
 
E 0.4
 
0.2
 
0 0
 
7 9 10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17
 
Nurse
 
Before Pay PerVisit After Pay Per Visit :
 
Survey Results ■ 
The other data collected was from a survey sent to the
 
seventeen nurses who participated in the study. A copy of
 
the survey tool is included in the appendix C. Eleven of
 
the seventeen nurses responded. The questions and responses
 
follow. 'V- ,
 
The first question asked the nurses if they like being
 
paid by the visit instead of by the hour. Two nurses felt
 
strongly that they did not like pay-per-visit. The rest
 
were either neutral (3 on the scale) or positive about pay-

per-visit. The mean response was 3.364 indicating that
 
overall, the nurses liked pay-per-visit more than hourly
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TABLE 7 - Survey Question #1
 
Do you like being paid by the visit instead of by the
 
hour?
 
1=N0; 5=YES
 
VALUE FREQ PERCENT
 
1 3 27.3 Mean: 3.364
 
3 2 18.2 Standard Deviation: 1.690
 
4 2 18.2
 
5 4 36.4
 
TOTAL 11 100.0
 
MC
The second question asked the nurses if they would
 
00
 
rH
 
prefer to be paid by the hour instead of by the visit. As
 
expected, the response was the reverse of the responses to
 
question #1. Four nurses felt strongly that they would not
 
prefer hourly pay. The mean was 2.727, indicating that
 
overall, the nurses did not prefer to be paid by the hour.
 
TABLE 8 - Survey Question #2
 
Would you prefer to be paid by the hour instead of by
 
the visit?
 
1=N0; 5=YES
 
VALUE FREQ PERCENT
 
1 4 36.4 Mean: 2.727
 
2 1 9.1 Standard Deviation: 1.618
 
3 2 18.2
 
4 2 18.2
 
5 2
 
TOTAL 11 100.0
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 The third question asked the nurses whether they
 
thought that pay-per-visit encourages or discourages quality
 
patient care. None of the nurses indicated that they felt
 
strongly that pay-per-visit encouraged quality of patient
 
care. Most felt neutral or strongly that pay-per-visit
 
discourages quality patient care. See Table 9.
 
TABLE 9 - Survey Question #3
 
Do you thing pay-per-visit encourages or discourages
 
quality patient care?
 OL
 
1 = DISCOURAGES;OL 3=N0 EFFECT; 5=ENC0URAGES
 
VALUE FREQ PERCENT
 
1 5 45.5 Mean: 2.182
 
, 3' ■ 5; Standard Deviation: 1.168 
4 1 9.1
 
TOTAL 11 100.0
 
The fourth question of the survey asked nurses whether
 
the felt that the pay-per-visit system promoted or detracted
 
from a "team approach" to patient care. 63% of the nurses
 
who responded felt that pay-per-visit had no effect on team
 
approach. The rest of the nurses felt that pay-per-visit
 
detracted from a team approach.
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TABLE 10 - Survey Question #4
 
Does pay-per-visit promote a "team approach" to
 
patient care or does it detract from a "team approach"
 
to patient care.
 
i ;:1 = DETRACTS; a=NO EFFECT; 5=PR0M0TES
 
VALUE FREQ PERCENT
 
1 18.2 Mean: 2.455
 
18.2 Standard Deviation: .820
■ • 2 
63.6
 
TOTAL 11 100.0
 
The fifth question on the survey asked the hurses i
 
whether they felt pay-per-visit had a positive or negative
 
effect on their income. Only three nurses felt that their ;
 
income had been negatively affected. The rest were either
 
neutral or felt that pay-per-visit had had a positive effect
 
on their income.
 
TABLE 11 - Survey Question #5
 
Has pay-per-visit had a positive or negative effect on
 
your income?
 
1 =NEGATIVE; 3=N0 EFFECT; 5=P0SITIVE
 
VALUE FREQ PERCENT
 
1 18.2 Mean: 3.273
 
2 1 9.1 Standard Deviation: 1.489
 
3 3 27.3
 
4 . 18.2
 
5 27.3
 
TOTAL 11 100.0
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The sixth question asked the nurse if they perceived a
 
change in the actual visit time of their visits. All but
 
one nurse felt that their visit time had not been influenced
 
by pay-per-visit. See Table 12.
 
TABLE 12 - Survey Question #6
 
On the average, has your actual visit time (travel
 
time plus time in the patient's home) increased or
 
decreased since implementation of pay-per-visit?
 
1 = DECREASED; 3=N0 CHANGE; 5=INCREASED
 
VALUE FREQ PERCENT 
1 1 9.1 Mean: 2.818 
3 10 90.9 Standard Deviation: .603 
TOTAL 11 100.0
 
The final question on the survey asked nurses if the
 
pay-per-visit system motivated them to make more visits per
 
day than when they were paid by the hour. The responses
 
were very scattered, with a mean of 2.818.
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 TABLE 13 - Survey Question #7
 
Does the pay-per-visit system motivate you to make more
 
visits per day than when you were paid by the hour?
 
I- =N0-; 5:=YES-;',/ ^ 
VALUE FREQ PERCENT 
-:1 ;■/ 3 ■■ 27. 3 [ Mean: 2.818 
-2 ^ ■ ■ \ .2 Standard Deviation: 1.471 
3' v.y .y'l-. 9.1 
4' . 1,; , ; 4: 36.4 
9.1 
TOTAL : 11 100.0 
MC 
OC 
H 
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CHAPTER 5 - CONCLUSIONS
 
Conclusions and Implications
 
Does a pay-per-visit system incentivize home health
 
nurses to be more productive, thus reducing direct costs and
 
yet maintaining quality patient care and employee
 
satisfaction? In order to address this problem, as
 
described in Chapter 1, eight research questions were asked.
 
The questions will be answered in the follpwing discussion
 
of the results of the study. The actual findings of the
 
data collection and computation of the variables considered
 
are presented in Chapter 4.
 
1. Is there a difference in nursing productivity as a
 
result of implementing a pay-per-visit system? In all but
 
one case, the nurses' productivity increased in the nine
 
months following implementation of pay-per-visit. The
 
average change in productivity was an increase of 27
 
percent. The one nurse whose productivity decreased was
 
very part time and only worked two of the randomly selected
 
days before and two days after pay-per-visit was
 
implemented. The data for this nurse was probably not
 
sufficient to make a statistically meaningful comparison.
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In addition to the above findings, the nurses who
 
responded to the survey were fairly neutral regarding the
 
motivational factor of pay-per-visit. Five nurses felt that
 
pay-per-visit did not motivate them to make more visits per
 
day and five nurses felt that pay-per-visit did motivate
 
them to be more productive. ; Only one nurse felt neutral
 
about whether pay-per-visit affected her motivation. It
 
would appear that even when the nurses did not perceive a
 
difference in their motivation, their behavior changed. The
 
data suggests that they were definitely more productive
 
after implementation of pay-per-visit. It is possible that
 
some nurses did not necessarily make more visits per
 
calendar day, but worked less hours because of more
 
efficient use of their time. The way the survey question
 
was worded may have influenced them to think in terms of a
 
calendar day whereas the study was based on eight hour work
 
days.
 
In answer to the question, there was a significant
 
difference in productivity as a result of pay-per-visit.
 
2. Is there a difference in the direct cost of a
 
nursing visit between hourly and pay-per-visit systems?
 
This question could not be directly answered with the data
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 obtained from the study since actual salary data was not
 
collected. However, if the nurses' productivity increased,
 
the direct nursing cost per visit should decrease.
 
It would probably be safe to infer that the cost per
 
visit would decrease after implementation of a pay-per-visit
 
system based on the data obtained from the study. In
 
addition to increased productivity, the nurses spent much
 
less time performing patient care related activities after
 
implementation of pay-per-visit. Before pay-per-visit,
 
nurses spent an average of 1.76 hours per billable visit in
 
patient care related activities. This included the actual
 
visit, travel time, non-revenue producing visits, and office
 
and charting time. After pay-per-visit was implemented, the
 
average time per visit decreased 22 percent to 1.44 hours
 
per billable visit.
 
Because of the increased productivity and decreased
 
patient care time spent per visit, it would indicate that
 
the direct nursing cost per visit would decrease with a pay-

per-visit system since the cost is no longer dependent on
 
hours worked. The pay-per-visit system provided an
 
incentive for the nurses to work more efficiently. Further
 
analysis of the data coupled with actual salary information
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would be necessary to accurately answer this question.
 
3. Is there a difference in the length of time nurses 
spend in patient's homes when nurses are paid per visit as 
opposed to hourly? This question was certainly answered by 
the data obtained. Before implementation of pay-per-visit, 
the : nurses spent of 1.04 hours per visit. This 
tiwe ihciuded the travel and actual timei in the:patidnt's 
home since there was no mechanism for separating travel time 
from the actual visit time. After implementatidn of pay­
pef-Visit/ the nurses spent an ayerage qf■ 0.95 hours per 
visit. This was a decrease of eight, percent . Average miles, 
per visit decreased less than one half mile per visit or six 
percent. This indicates that the majority of the time saved 
was in actual visit time. 
4. Is there a difference in the amount of time spent 
by nurses in patient care conferences when they are paid per 
visit? the data indicates that nurses spent more time in 
patient care conferences after the implementation of pay-
per-visit, however, the difference was small. Before 
implementation of pay-per-visit, the nurses spent an average 
of 0.05 hours in patient conferences per eight hours worked 
compared to 0.06 hours per eight hours worked after 
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 implementation of pay-per-visit. Even though the actual
 
time difference was only 0.01 hour, it was an increase of
 
twenty percent. This may indicate that the nurses continued
 
to view patient conferences as an important function in
 
maintaining quality care and appropriate coordination of
 
services.
 
5. Is there a difference in the amount of time spent
 
in inservices and staff meetings when nurses are paid per
 
visit? There was a very remarkable difference in the amount
 
of time the nurses spent in staff meetings and inservices
 
after the implementation of pay-per-visit. The actual time
 
decreased from 0.32 hours per eight hours worked to 0.10
 
hours which is a decrease of 69 percent.
 
6. Are nurses satisfied with pay-per-visit? Do they
 
want to continue or would they prefer to return to hourly
 
pay? As shown in the survey results, most nurses are
 
satisfied with pay-per-visit and do not wish to return to
 
hourly pay. The mean response on a scale of one to five was
 
3.364 in favor of continuing pay-per-visit.
 
7. Do nurses feel that they are receiving fair and
 
equitable compensation with per-per-visit? Although the
 
survey question was not worded in a manner that directly
 
■ 71 ■ ■ ■ 
answers this question, most nurses who responded to the
 
survey felt that the pay-per-visit system had had a positive
 
impact on their income. The question failed to ascertain
 
whether they felt a sense qf fairness in comparison to other
 
nurses, nurses in other settings, or hourly pay.
 
8. Do nurses feel that quality of care is jeopardized
 
by a pay-per-visit system? Most nurses felt that pay-per­
visit discourages quality of care. 45.5% of those
 
responding felt strongly that quality of care was
 
discouraged and 45.5% felt that pay-per-visit had no effect
 
on quality. One nurse responded that pay-per-visit
 
encouraged quality of care. When asked about the effect on
 
team approach to patient care, the majority of nurses
 
(63.6%) felt that there was no impact. The remaining 36.4%
 
felt that pay-per-visit detracts from team approach. This
 
question was not adequately answered by the study, because
 
the nurses were not asked to respond to whether they
 
themselves had altered the quality of care that they
 
performed. The concept of pay-per-visit may cause them to
 
think that quality of care would be affected, but whether or
 
not they saw evidence of that was not explored.
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Limitations of the Study
 
The size of the sample population of nurses was limited 
to those who worked an entire eighteen month period as 
defined by the study. They also were confined to one Home 
Health Agency. While this method provided a valid V- : 
comparison of ■ the nurses' behavior before and after 
implementation of pay-per-visit, it would have been 
preferred to have a larger sample size and look at nurses at 
more than one agency. 
While nurse opinions are probably quite valid, there
 
was no mechanism to measure the outcome of care which would
 
be appropriate in determining whether pay-per-visit had any
 
real effect on the quality of care. This is an ongoing
 
problem in the home care industry and to date, there have
 
not been any developments recognized within the industry to
 
adequately measure actual outcomes of care. This is an
 
ongoing project in the industry.
 
As mentioned earlier, the study did not provide any
 
financial data which would substantiate whether pay-per­
visit actually provided cost savings. The answer to this
 
questioned had to be inferred from the increased
 
productivity and efficiency of the nurses. A further and
 
more in depth look could be undertaken to review the actual
 
financial data of the RamonaVNA & Hospice to accurately
 
answer this question.
 
The survey questions did not elicit an opinion from the
 
nurses about the quality of the care that they individually
 
provided. It would have been interesting to compare how
 
they felt in general about the effect of pay-per-visit on
 
quality of care compared to how they perceived their own
 
quality of care.
 
Recommendations
 
Future research is indicated to further determine the
 
effect of pay-per-visit on team work and quality of patient
 
care. It would also be interesting to differentiate between
 
nurses who are case managers and those who are not, since
 
their responsibilities are different. Casemanagers have
 
more responsibility in the overall management implementation
 
of the patient's plans of care. The nurses in the study
 
comprised a mixture of case managers and other nurses
 
without case management responsibilities.
 
As mentioned in the above section, further study would
 
be appropriate to determine actual cost savings to the Home
 
Health Agency.
 
Application of Study Findings to VNAIC
 
As a result of the findings of the above study, the
 
Visiting Nurse Association of the inlahd Ggunties developed
 
and implemented a pay-per-visit policy tailored to meet the
 
needs of that agency. The overall goal was cost-containment
 
and providing incentives for staff to be efficient and
 
productive.
 
:Because of the nurses responses which indicated concern
 
about the impact of pay-per-visit on team work and quality
 
of care, it was decided that nurse casemanagers, who have
 
overall responsibility for coordination of patient care,
 
would remain on hourly pay. Other disciplines and nurses
 
who do not have case management responsibility were included
 
in the pay per visit plan.
 
It would appear in initial review of the financial data
 
for the first month of implementation that the conversion of
 
many employees to pay-per-visit has had a positive impact.
 
Informal conversations with staff have also indicated a
 
positive level of satisfaction. A very small number of
 
staff who were changed to pay-per-visit have resigned,
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 stating that they prefer not to wonk under that plan. These
 
individuals were,ones who had previously been identified as
 
having low productivity. Some staff members who were very
 
concerned about the change have expressed relief and actual
 
satisfaction with the plan, stating that they now feel that
 
they have some control over the amount of money they earn
 
and they feel a much more direct relationship between their
 
efforts and their pay.
 
: In the short amount of time since implementation of the
 
pay-per-visit plan, the Visiting Nurse Association of the
 
Inland Counties is viewing it as successful in providing
 
cost-containment and incentives for staff to work more
 
efficiently. The plan is contained in Appendix D.
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 EMPLOYEE NAME EMPLOYEE NO^ DATE. 
;PATIENT NO.' 
• 
I ;j / >,PATjENTNAME 
Firit COMMENTS 
VISIT 
TYPET 
VISIT 
TYPE 
COOES 
BILLINQ 
status 
BILLINQ STATUS 
CODES 
START 
TIME 
FINISH 
TIME 
TOTAL 
HOURS 
t-SN 
2-PT 
3-ST 
4-OT 
0 •Bitlubla Visit 
t •Blllal)leAdin 
2 -Biilalile Eviit Only 
3 •NorrBiUabIa Visit 
M 
H 
5-MSW 4 •NonBitlable Adih. 
6-HHA 
7.PICC 
8-SNET 
5 .NonBiHabii Eval Only 
6 -HHA Supervision 
7 -MCal Adm or Eval 
8 •MCair-ist Vlsllot Ma 
9 -Not Home/Not Foiind 
H-llMa 
8 -Baieaverheni 
OFFICE CODE:V 
2 - Sun City 
5 - Hemiali 
ODOMETER READINGS 
Finish 
Start 
Total 
□Patlant Cara 
n ; 
TOTAL NUMBER VISITS , 
: NON-VISIT LABOR 
CHARTING 
, 
SUB TOTAL PATIENT HOURS . 
CLASSCODE: 
1 n«otjl«r Hoina llMlih 
2•Horn* liaallh llotplc* 
9•HMB 
4- Olaianc* 
6-4i|.Tach 
PAYOR CODE: 
1 • MadlparaA 
2 > Madlcara B 
d-HI-Tach/oiiUnca 
7^HH.ilotplca/OiiiUnc* 
B-HU »U>»plc»/Hi.T«cti 
«-UH.|loapica/lU^T»cii/ 
Finish 
Stan 
Total 
Rnlsh 
Stan 
Total 
Total Patlant 
Miles s? 
Total Other 
OPatient Caret 
n 
□Patient Care 
O ____ 
PATIENT CARE CONFERENCE 
AGENCY MEETINGS/INSERVICE 
OFFICE/OTHER 
PUT-OF-OFFICE/OTHER 
OUT-OF-AGENCY EDUCATION 
TRAVEL TIME 
3 - Mad.a- Outpatiant 
5 - Madl-Cal 
7 - All OlhaTPayora 
a • Kalsar Pladga 
LUNCH 
ON CALL (12:01 a m. to 12:00 p.m) 
-P« To ; 
. •m' -
-ptii To . 
»m 
-pm To . 
. hfs. 
. hrs; 
. hrs. 
CLERICAL 
BREAKS 
CpMP TIME USED 
PTO 
From. To. 
Tolal, 
STI 
PIB 
EMPLOYEE HOURS TO BE COMPUTED AT TIME AND A HALF 
BR. MGR.. 
COMPtlMF 
qvertImf 
TOTAL HOURS: . 
RVN-035 Rov.7/ei 
rOMPilTriV hrn.triTiM-»n 
APPENDIX B - DATA COLLECTION SHEET
 
NURSE #
 
INSERVICE 
# TOTAL TOTAL PATIENT PATIENT /staff 
PATIENT 
DATE BILLABLE HOURS PATIENT VISIT CONFERENCE MILES VISIT 
MEETING 
VISITS WORKED CARE TIME TIME TIME TIME 
TIME 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
/ 
TOTAL 
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APPENDIX C - SURVEY
 
NO 	 YES
 
2.
 
NOx':, 	 ; ,.YES
 
3. 	 Do you think pay-per-visit encourages or
 
DISCOURAGES NO EFFECT ENCOURAGES
 
QUALITY CARE ON QUALITY x QUALITY CARE
 
4i 	 Does pay-per-visit promote a "teanri approach" to patient care or does it
 
detractfrom a "team approach"to patient care?
 
• . 1 x'./2;; . 	 5
 
DETRACTS FROM NO EFFECT PROMOTES
 
TEAM APPROACH ON TEAM APPROACH TEAM APPROACH
 
5. 	 Has pay-per-visit had a positive or negative effect on your income?
 
•'■1 . 2 '• ■ 3' ' ' ' 4 ■ ' 
NEGATIVE NO POSITIVE 
EFFECT EFFECT EFFECT 
6. 	 On an average, has your actual visit time (travel time plus time in the 
patients' homes) increased or decreased since implementation of pay-per­
visit? ■■•■ 'X'. ;/■ ; , x. . ;- - a. ^X/ ■ ■ X' ; „ X- ^. ; ;:,x 
■' X "Ix- X :X;:2- ; 3 ' Xxxr, X x' 4 ■ X ; . : ; 5 
DECREASED NO CHANGE 	 INCREASED 
7. 	 Does the pay-per-visit, system motivate you to make more visits per day
than when you were paid by the hour? 
■ xX'l ' '.x ' ■ ■X>2x X^■'x: . ^ . ' 3 'X' X Xx'x ■ ■X4 . X . 'X Xx;; . 5 ■ 
' ' ' 'NOx"■' 'x■ . :; ;'V:■ ' '■^^^;::xx^ yes .'x"--^ 
79 
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POLICY
 
Agency administration determines which clinical employees are paid on a per-visit rate and which are
 
paid on an hourly rate. The pay^per-visit(PPV)program is based on each employee's hourly wage,
 
which is determined according to Agency policies regarding compensation. Being paid on a per-visit
 
basis does not affect the employee's classification or benefit status.
 
AsofSeptember 1,1996the following Home Health and Hospice employees are paid on a per-visit
 
basis,according to the following procedures:
 
a. 	 Therapists and Therapy Assistants(PT,OT,SP)
 
b. 	 Home Health Aides
 
c. 	 LVN's
 
d. 	 PerDiemRN's
 
e. 	 Social Workersand Social Work Assistants
 
f. 	 Chaplains
 
PROCEDURE
 
1. 	 EachPPV employee maintains a base hourly wage rate consistent with their assigned salary
 
grade and is eligible for salary increases as described in Section 2.10,Performance
 
Evaluations.
 
2. 	 Visitrates are calculated by multiplying the appropriate visit factortimes the employee's base
 
hourly rate. Visitfactors are subjectto change.
 
The visit rate includes:
 
a. 	 Actualtime spentconducting the visit.
 
b. 	 All scheduling and pre-visit preparation.
 
c. 	 Traveltime to and from the visit. (Travel time fi-om a visit is usually considered as
 
traveltime to the next visit.)
 
d. 	 All required documentation.
 
e. 	 Communication with otherteam members and/orthe patient's physician.
 
f. 	 Follow-up and coordination pertaining to implementation ofthe patient's plan of
 
care.
 
g. 	 Delivery oflab specimens obtained during the visit.
 
3. 	 All visits are to be arranged in advance. Time spentin conjunction with not-at-home or
 
refused visits will be paid atthe base hourly rate ifthe visits were arranged with the patient or
 
patient's caregiver on the day ofthe visit. Ifa patient does not have atelephone,
 
arrangements forfollow-up visits mustbe made during each visit and this communication
 
mustbe reflected in the documentation.
 
4. 	 Unusual circumstances,i.e. excessively long travel time ofgreater than 1 hour in each
 
direction,and/or procedures which require unusually long visits ofgreater than2hours,may
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^ waiiteant payinefltofthe time speritih conjunction wit^
 
ofthePPyrate. These cases require prior authorizatipn from the Supervisor. Rehab staff
 
and Social Workers rriay be assigned gepgraphie differentials.^
 
5. 	 Other assigned and authorized activities are paid atthe base hourly fate for the actual amount
 
oftirne spentin these approved activities,ihcluding:
 
a. 	 Formal patient care conferences up to2hours/pay period
 
b. 	 Liaison activities
 
c. ■ 	 Required staffmeetings up to2hours/pay period 
d. 	 Inservice education up to2hours/month
 
e. 	 Orientation(See Section6below)
 
f. 	 Quality/PerformanceImprovement activities
 
g. 	 Agency committee meetings
 
6. 	 New hires are paid attheir base hourly rate to attend the Agency's initial orientation
 
(includingHR orientation)as follows:
 
Chaplain Upto8 hours
 
Rehab Employees Upto 16 hours RN's/LVN's Up to2weeks or80 hours
 
Social Workers Upto 16 hours HHA's Up to 1 week or40hours
 
Any extension ofthis initial orientation period must be approved bythe Branch Manager and
 
the Q/PI Manager. In addition,participation in the Agency-wide orientation program in
 
Riverside,which is required for all employees,is paid on an hourly basis.
 
7. 	 Employees are required to record the actual hoursthey work on their Route and Time Sheets.
 
This includes all activities performed which are included in the visit rate as well astime paid
 
atthe base hourly rate. All time is recorded in 1/4 hour increments.
 
8. 	 All patient visits and other work performed are expected to be completed within the
 
employee's regular work day,thus avoiding overtime. Anytime worked in excessofthe
 
employee's regular work day or work week will be considered overtime. All overtime must
 
be approved by the Supervisor or designee in advance.
 
9. 	 Ifthe employee's assignment is completed before the end oftheir agreed-upon shift,they
 
mustremain available for additional assignments. Ifnot available by phone,expected
 
response time to a beeper page is fifteen minutes.
 
10. 	 A differential is paid to nursesfor visits made between 10:00 p.m.and 6:00 a.m.(see Section
 
3.09,On-call Nursing),and on Agency designated holidays(see Section 3.05,Holidays).
 
The differential is paid per visit and is the same regardless ofthe type ofvisit made.
 
11. 	 For benefitted employees,all paid time off(PTO,STI,etc.)hours will be paid atthe
 
employee's base hourly rate. Accruals will be made based on acmaltime worked and paid
 
time off,notto exceed40hours per week.
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PAY PER VISIT - VISIT FACTOR TABLE
 
RN/LVN
 
Admission Visits:
 
Routine Admission
 
One-time Visit Requiring 485
 
NflC One-timeor Adniissipri
 
Specialty Admit Visits:
 
IV(Tlierapy initiated during admission visit)
 
ET(Requires skills ofRNET)
 
Psych(Requires Mental Health Nurse)
 
Regular Visits(RN):
 
Follow-up Visit
 
Eval only/No further care
 
Mutual visits
 
Regular Visits(LVN)
 
HHA Supervision Visits 
Night/Holiday Differential Visits* 
HHA 
Regular Visits 
Night/Holiday Differential Visits* 
SW/SWA 
Regular Visits 
Night/Holiday Differential Visits* 
CHAPLAIN 
Regular Visits 
Night/Holiday Differential Visits* 
REHAB: PT/PTA,OT/OTA,SP 
Regular Visits 
Night/Holiday Differential Visits* 
DifferentialPoints: 
Tr^ivel (refer to individual differential sheet)
 
PT/OT Supervision ofPTA/OTA
 
INTERMITTENT HOSPICE
 
2.0
 
■ ^2.5 ^ ­
2.0	 N/A
 
2.0 ■	 N/A 
2.5 :
 
2.5	 N/A
 
N/A -y
yy'- 2.5
 
:y;:i.7;r''':yv
 
1.5 ' . 1.7
 
; 1.5
 
■, 1.3 1.5 
.5", ■ 
$10/visit $10/visit 
. .. 1.4 1.7
 
$5/visit $5/visit
 
2.0 2.0 
$10/visit $10/visit 
2.0 2.0 
$10/visit $10/visit 
2.0 2.0 
$10/visit $10/visit 
$l/point / $l/point 
$10/visit $IO/visit 
*]^efer to Personnel Policy Manual Sections 3.05 and 3.09. ,TheHoliday pifferentialispaid only for visits that the 
employee is requitedby the manager to make. 
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